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Abstract
The changing political and social meanings of space under conditions of advanced globalization point
to the need to analyze security—or the deployment and management of violence—as a socio-spatial
practice. This article draws attention to the “methodological nationalist’ bias that has traditionally
characterized mainstream security studies, and discusses its effect on how security issues are studied
and conceptualized. Building on insights from political geography and sociology, the article makes
the case for a “spatial turn” in the field. It demonstrates how a socio-spatial approach can help make
sense of evolving state security practices, and presents examples of non-national spaces of security—
including cities, cyberspace, and the global polity. Such spaces are increasingly objects of security
practices, although the implications of this remain largely under-theorized in security studies.
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Introduction
A drone operator sitting in Nevada, in the United States,
operates a remote device that kills a human target thou-
sands of miles away in Afghanistan; a boat filled with
Eritrean refugees trying to migrate to Europe collapses in
the Mediterranean; a French gunman trained in Yemen by
al-Qaeda assassinates cartoonists in Paris;1 a Swedish neo-
Nazi battles Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine;2 a violent
organization attempting to establish an Islamic caliphate
posts videos of a West London man killing American and
Japanese humanitarian workers in Syria; and a United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) refu-
gee camp for 350,000 Somali refugees is threatened with
closure by the Kenyan government following a terrorist at-
tack on a university.3
These are some of the modes of violence that charac-
terize the contemporary global security environment.
What is notable about them, in addition to the human
devastation accompanying each incident, is the analyti-
cal challenge they pose to traditional approaches to se-
curity. None of these incidents are clear examples of
either interstate conflict or civil war; each of these inci-
dents links very different spaces together in ways that
defy a “national security” logic; all of these cases call
into question some of the basic spatial assumptions that
undergird much of the scholarly literature in security
studies. Collectively, they direct our attention toward
other “spaces of security,” such as refugee camps, the
high seas, cyberspace, and cities, as well as the “global”
itself as a coherent political space.1 David Gauthier-Villars, Noe´mie Bisserbe, and Julian E.
Barnes, “Suspect in Charlie Hebdo Attack Was Trained in
Yemen,”Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2015.
2 Dina Newman, “Ukraine Conflict: ‘White Power’ Warrior
from Sweden,” BBC News, July 16, 2014.
3 Duncan Miriri, “Kenya Demands UN Remove Massive
Refugee Camp,” Reuters, April 11, 2015.
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The inaugural issue of the Journal of Global Security
Studies presents an opportunity to reframe how we
think about security. The very name of the journal spurs
us to move beyond the nation-state as the sole focus of
security practices and discourses and thereby suggests
possibilities for theorizing alternative topographies of
security. It opens up “the global” and its constituent
parts to interrogation and analysis, and by doing so
urges us to raise questions about where security prac-
tices and discourses are located, thus allowing us to jux-
tapose actors and connect processes that operate in very
different physical (or virtual) locales.
In my contribution to this special issue, I argue that
the future of global security studies requires a “spatial
turn.” As security scholars we miss—in the words of
Waltz (1986, 329)—a lot of “big and important things”
by not taking seriously the spatial dimensions of secu-
rity. Despite a great deal of literature on the territorial
nature of the state in international relations (IR) and po-
litical geography (e.g., Ruggie 1993; Agnew 1994, 2003;
Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Sjoberg 2008; Elden 2009,
2013; Ingram and Dodds 2009), the field of security
studies has yet to fully embrace the notion of security as
a socio-spatial practice—one that increasingly takes
place in post-national and non-national spaces.
What does a “spatial turn” mean in practice? First
and foremost, it does not mean that we should throw
out the state, state interests, or state practices, all of
which are very much still at the core of global security
concerns and need to be analyzed as such. It does, how-
ever, mean that we should not fetishize and reify the
“national” as the only space in which security practices
and discourses are formed and take place. It means iden-
tifying and theorizing non-national spaces of security
and analyzing how these interact with state practices
and with each other. And it means paying attention to
how the socio-spatial practices of security change over
time and how they vary with the changing social mean-
ings and constructions of space that accompany new
technologies, rises in social connectivity, and increased
“time-space compression” (Harvey 1989).
Such a project—a “spatial turn” in security studies—
does not necessarily map on to any particular normative
or theoretical agenda in the field. Realists; liberal inter-
nationalists; globalists; cosmopolitans; feminists; trans-
nationalists; relationalists; network analysts; scholars of
civil war, insurgency, or terrorism; and academics or
practitioners interested in broadening and deepening no-
tions of security can all benefit in different ways from
paying more attention to the geographical and socio-
spatial dimensions of security. For example, realist
approaches can gain from a “spatial turn” in security
studies through a focus on the spatial dimensions of the
exercise of state power, such as the emergence of global
networks of military bases and their effects (Cooley
2005, 2008); the dynamics and implications of drone
warfare; or the efforts of state actors to mobilize dias-
pora populations (Adamson 2006; Adamson and
Demetriou 2007; Gamlen 2008, 2014; Ragazzi 2009,
2014). Security scholars who study non-state actors,
transnational networks, and contentious politics can uti-
lize a spatial approach to gain insight into how these ac-
tors, networks, and processes are shaped or even
constituted by the resources and opportunities embed-
ded in particular locales (such as global cities or cyber-
space, both discussed later in this article). I do not
attempt here to provide a comprehensive survey of how
a “spatial turn” contributes to each of these varied re-
search agendas. Instead, I suggest its potential as a lens
through which to engage with contemporary security is-
sues, and I identify some significant “non-national”
spaces of global security.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. First, I
introduce the concept of “methodological nationalism”
and explain how it institutionalizes a particular “spatial
bias” in security studies. Second, I suggest the means to
address this bias by instigating a “spatial turn” in the
field. I draw on insights from geographers and sociologists
who have theorized the nature of space, its construction,
and its effects on social practices, as well as on work in
international relations (IR) informed by political geogra-
phy. I argue that we can use insights developed in these
literatures to gain a better understanding of the spatial di-
mensions of state practices and how they interact with
non-national spaces. I then identify and elaborate on three
non-national spaces—global cities, cyberspace, and the
global polity. These three “spaces of security” are meant
to be illustrative but not exhaustive. Nevertheless, they
are all emerging as significant spaces of global political
engagement that are also objects of security practices, and
thus are ripe for further empirical research in security
studies. Finally, I conclude with some additional thoughts
on what a “spatial turn” brings to security studies.
Methodological Nationalism and Security
Studies
In two important pieces, Andreas Wimmer and Nina
Glick Schiller have made the case that the contemporary
social sciences are biased by their reliance on the as-
sumptions of “methodological nationalism.” Although
their argument was aimed primarily at scholars of mi-
gration and transnationalism, it is also helpful for illumi-
nating an underlying bias in security studies.
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Methodological nationalism may be defined as “the nat-
uralization of the nation-state by the social sciences”
and “the assumption that the state/nation/society is the
natural social and political form of the modern world”
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, 301; 2003, 576).
Methodological nationalism, they argue, has resulted in
three types of bias that are widespread in the social sci-
ences: “(1) ignoring or disregarding the fundamental im-
portance of nationalism for modern societies . . . (2)
naturalization, that is, taking for granted that the
boundaries of the nation-state delimit and define the
unit of analysis, and (3) territorial limitation, which con-
fines the study of social processes to the political and
geographic boundaries of a particular nation-state.”
These three biases interact to form “a coherent epistemic
structure, a self-reinforcing way of looking at and de-
scribing the social world” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller
2003, 577–78). Furthermore, “[s]cholars who share this
intellectual orientation assume that countries are the
natural units for comparative studies, equate society
with the nation-state, and conflate national interest with
the purposes of social science. Methodological national-
ism reflects and reinforces the identification that many
scholars maintain with their own nation-states”
(Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003, 576).
Methodological nationalism, or the naturalization
and reification of the nation-state as a sociological form,
is arguably what allows security scholars and others to
think of a world of nation-states as the starting point for
analysis. States are either conceptualized as “actors”
(corporate agents) or “arenas” (territorial spaces).
Indeed, these two aspects of “stateness” are often con-
flated in the literature, leading to methodological impre-
cision and confusion—“China” sometimes refers to a
geographic place, and sometimes refers to an actor or
agent. This is arguably because nationalism—an ideol-
ogy that binds an identity to a particular territorial
structure—suggests that political identity and territory
are coterminous.
Nationalism is still largely ignored or left under-
theorized as a constitutive element of state corporate
agency in world politics. Taken to its logical end, this
leads to claims of anthropomorphism in which “states
are people, too” (Wendt 1999, 2004; Mitzen 2006,
2013; Berenskoetter 2014). Moreover, there are few
fields of study in which scholars are as identified with
their own state’s interests as security studies, especially
in approaches that combine analysis with policy recom-
mendations. One is hard-pressed to imagine an article in
a contemporary English language security studies jour-
nal ending with policy recommendations for how al-
Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) could more effectively
mobilize support, or with advice as to how Russia or
China could best contain American power.
Paradoxically, realists such as Kenneth Waltz, in his
earlier work, were more cognizant of the important role
played by nationalism in producing the unitary state.
Waltz recognized the importance of nationalism as a
constitutive element of corporate agency in Man, the
State and War (1954, 175–76) (although this element
was later dropped in Theory of International Politics;
Waltz 1979) and noted that “it does violence to one’s
common sense to speak of the state, which is after all an
abstraction and consequently inanimate, as acting.” He
justified his treatment of the state as a unitary actor by
taking what was essentially a constructivist position—
focusing on the importance of the strength and nature of
group sentiment or collective identity, specifically the
group sentiment that is produced historically through a
combination of modern technology and the emergence
of nationalism as a unifying political ideology:
The existence of group patriotism has no special meaning
for our analysis until . . . it becomes infused with the idea of
nationality. Then we have the immensely important fact of
modern nationalism . . . the growth of nationalism is synony-
mous with the integration of the masses into a common
political form . . . With the development of modern technol-
ogy, especially as applied to the means of transportation
and communication, it has become possible for the inter-
ests of individuals to be thought of as tightly
complementary . . . The centripetal force of nationalism may
itself explain why states can be thought of as units.
States could, therefore, be understood as “units” be-
cause they were held together by a collective identity,
expressing that common identity and purpose in such a
way that “the state appears to other states as a unit”
(Waltz 1954, 178). Ultimately, this is an argument about
how a particular historical configuration of communica-
tions technology allows states to be conceptualized as
territorially defined corporate agents.
When the assumptions of methodological national-
ism are brought together with insights from the litera-
ture on state-building, we can elucidate the underlying
relationship that has historically existed between nation-
alism and security practices in contemporary states.
Contemporary nation-states are the historical products
of the use of large measures of violence to set and main-
tain state borders, to produce and reproduce national
identities, and to define and control populations, who
become understood as “nationals” (Weber 1978; Tilly
1990; Torpey 1998, 241). The emergence of modern na-
tion-states has been accompanied, in many cases, by eth-
nic cleansing, population exchanges, genocide, and
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programs of assimilation and homogenization (Arendt
1948 [1973]; Zolberg 1983; Rae 2002; Mann 2005).
Furthermore, the project of national state-building itself
was motivated in large part by the need to mobilize re-
sources and human capital to support large-scale war-
fare (Tilly 1990; Spruyt 1994).
The deployment of high levels of violence continues to
undergird state practices and identities, with states repro-
ducing their identities and borders via the use of coercive
practices. “States dispose of a large arsenal of coercive
tools to force their version of society on the population,”
writes Wimmer (2013, 70). Citing Appadurai (1998), he
adds, “violence makes clear, in a complex situation of
overlapping group membership, on whose loyalty one can
rely. Violence marks ‘them’ off ‘from us’,” demarcating the
dangerous tumor from the healthy flesh of the nation’s
body” (Wimmer 2013, 71). Violence thus operates as a
way of reifying and maintaining symbolic boundaries and
collective identities, but also as a way of disrupting them.
Weak actors, as well as strong actors, use violence to define
and solidify identity boundaries. In fact, the use of violence
is arguably one of the most effective ways to transform
“blurred” (i.e., porous and negotiable) boundaries into
“bright” (i.e., fixed and nonnegotiable) ones (Alba 2005).
This understanding of the relationship between vio-
lence and collective identities suggests some serious
weaknesses and blind spots in some of the traditional
state-centric approaches to security studies. Much of the
scholarship in security studies has viewed “security” as
being largely about the policies and practice of one
“unit” or “actor” responding to threats or violence from
another “unit” or “actor.” This, however, misses the
role that security and violence themselves have played in
boundary making, and how they structure discourses
and practices that contribute to the production and
maintenance of collective identities. Indeed, national se-
curity discourses routinely contain language and rhetoric
that is intended to delineate the “other” or create an en-
emy image—in other words, discourses designed to de-
fine and enforce “bright” and nonnegotiable
boundaries. This demarcation of the “other” plays a key
role in producing and maintaining identities that form
the basis for security strategies (Campbell 1992;
Neumann 1996). For example, one need only think of
US President George W. Bush’s post-9/11 “with us or
against us” rhetoric or Barack Obama’s labeling of IS as
a “cancer” that needs to be eliminated.4
Within the context of the nation-state, violence, col-
lective identity, and territory come together in a particu-
lar spatial configuration in which a political unit can be
conceived of as a territorially defined corporate agent.
This historical convergence allows for the emergence of
particular forms of theorizing in which questions of spa-
tiality, identity, and the construction and maintenance
of collective “actorhood” (stateness) fall by the wayside.
The constitutive dimension of corporate agency can be
left untheorized, resulting in a particular spatial ontol-
ogy of nation-states as units and actors.
What is the significance of this for security studies?
First, methodological nationalism has the effect of struc-
turing the field of security studies in particular ways,
from how war itself is defined to how quantitative data-
sets, such as The Correlates of War Project (COW), are
produced. Wars are spatialized and coded as either tak-
ing place “between” states or “within” states—thus dis-
regarding the socio-spatial dimensions of how wars are
actually fought. Contemporary drone warfare, for ex-
ample, leads to the complete physical separation of the
combatant from the battlefield, the battlefield from a
war, and the combatant from civil society (Wilcox
2015). Counterinsurgency strategies and equipment
used in distant locales can return “home” and be applied
to domestic populations via the militarization of polic-
ing, where social protest is likened to a nascent insur-
gency.5 These connections between battlefield strategies
and domestic surveillance and policing are lost in tradi-
tional approaches to security.
Similarly, a methodological nationalist bias renders
invisible cases in which the center of gravity (Clausewitz
1989) of a “civil war” actually exists external to a state.
The spatial dimensions of civil wars in states such as
Kosovo, Sri Lanka, and Turkey have all shifted over
time, with external actors, such as diaspora populations
in Europe or North America, playing a more or less sig-
nificant role in providing resources and support for the
conflicts (Brun and Van Hear 2012; Koinova 2013). The
“external” dimensions of “internal” conflicts are ob-
scured in traditional nation-state models of security.
Similarly, a “local conflict” that would be more accu-
rately analyzed as a manifestation of larger structural
and systemic factors (Hironaka 2005) may be misunder-
stood due to a dominant spatial imaginary that treats
the state as the space where civil wars take place (i.e.,
within state boundaries).
Quantitative studies of “the democratic peace” are
similarly spatialized, treating states as autonomous units
4 Michael D. Shear and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Obama,
‘Appalled’ by Beheading, Will Continue Airstrikes,” New
York Times, August 20, 2014. 5 Thanks to Alexander Montgomery for these examples.
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that exist in a fictional reality disembedded from larger
global forces—and which ignore spatially “inconve-
nient” dynamics such as covert and proxy wars
(Barkawi and Laffey 1999). Much of the literatures on
foreign policy, rational bargaining, deterrence, and com-
pellence are also undergirded by a methodological bias
that obscures processes of internal state mobilization,
cohesion, and repression—a point that was made early
on by security scholars who studied “third world” states
(David 1991; Ayoob 1997).
A focus on security practices, discourses, and relations,
rather than spatially predefined actors and units, allows for
the possibility of bringing alternative “spaces of security”
into the mainstream of security studies. A socio-spatial
approach to security studies understands territorial nation-
states to be only one of many “spaces” that are constituted
through practices of violence, and thus directs us to look at
the relationship between “boundary-making” and security
as it occurs in a wider variety of (non-national) spaces.
Taking a lead from history, geography, anthropology, and
other disciplines, it is time for security studies to “go glob-
al.” Scholars need to rethink how the field orients itself to
fundamental questions about how physical and social
spaces are constructed and imagined, and the concomitant
implications of this for theorizing security.
New Spaces of Global Security
Nation-states are historical constructions that bring to-
gether (national) identities and practices of violence in
territorialized socio-spatial configurations. States con-
tinue to be naturalized as the dominant “spaces” of se-
curity in IR and security studies. Yet, advanced
conditions of globalization are creating new spaces in
which identity and security come together in ways that
still have not been fully theorized. Paying attention to
these new spaces does not mean throwing out the state
as a key security actor or locus of security practices,
adopting a naı¨ve form of globalism, or committing one-
self to a spatial determinism (Porter 2015). It does, how-
ever, require that one understand the changing spatial
dimensions of state practices and the exercise of state
power, and analyze how these interact with other
“spaces of global security.”
Space is as much a construct as it is a physical entity.
Geographers, such as Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), Harvey
(1989, 2000, 2006), and Soja (1989), have distinguished
between the spaces of capitalism, especially as they
emerge in urban contexts, and other conceptualizations
of space, such as religious spaces infused with sacred
meanings (see Hassner 2003, 2009). Massey (2005) ex-
tends these notions by examining the ways in which
contemporary spaces are sites of multiple and interlink-
ing power relations that operate at many levels, from the
micro-level of the physical body to the local, national,
and global levels. These levels can be thought of as scales
and scalar processes and are helpful for mapping out the
complexities of spatial arrangements in ways that are
more sophisticated than a simple levels-of-analysis ap-
proach (Sjoberg 2008). Space is always defined and co-
constituted by a multiplicity of heterogeneous relations
and interactions, including practices of violence. What
William Sewell (2001, 51–52) argues regarding the liter-
ature on contentious politics can be equally applied to
security studies, which has “treated space as an assumed
and unproblematized background, not as a constituent
aspect that must be conceptualized explicitly and probed
systematically” (see also Martin and Miller 2003;
Leitner, Sheppard, and Sziarto 2008).
Theorizing the socio-spatial dimensions of particular
practices has been usefully employed as a means of gain-
ing greater analytical leverage across a number of other
issue areas in international politics. Smirl (2008, 2015),
for example, has examined the importance of the socio-
spatial in the construction of contemporary “spaces of
aid” and “humanitarian spaces.” Examining how hu-
manitarian aid is physically and spatially organized
helps illuminate aspects of identity and power relations,
as it often acts as a spatial representation of larger
North–South inequalities. Spaces of confinement, such
as the refugee camp, separate out victim populations,
while aid workers congregate in the lobbies of interna-
tional hotels and drive around in white sports utility
vehicles (SUVs). Forms of spatial confinement affect the
human security of millions of individuals around the
world and represent a particular form of exercising
power—of separating out “them” from “us.” For exam-
ple, the spread of detention practices and so-called
“black sites” across a variety of states was an integral
part of post-9/11 counterinsurgency strategies, but de-
tention has also been a response to irregular migration,
refugee flows, and domestic crime. Seen in aggregate,
such spaces of confinement and detention collectively
constitute a distinctive type of space and form of securi-
tization of populations that is widespread across the
globe (Khalili 2012; Lundby 2015).
Spaces of humanitarian crises and tourism have come
together in physical locales such as the Italian island of
Lampedusa or the Greek islands of Kos and Lesbos, as
desperate migrants inhabit the same space as European
holidaymakers.6 On the other side of the Mediterranean,
6 “How Many More Can Kos Take?” Daily Mail, May 27, 2015.
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similarly disjointed scenes of tourists and armed violence
came together in attacks on the Bardo National Museum
in Tunis and the beach resorts of Sousse. Such incidents
suggest the need to expand our view of how we think
about where security practices take place, how security
relates to different types of spaces, what the political im-
plications of this are, and how it relates to the future of
global security. In order to further explore some of these
issues, the rest of this section looks more closely at three
“non-national” spaces of global security that are ripe for
further elaboration.
Global Cities
If the particular spatial configuration of the nation-state
epitomized modernity, global cities may epitomize the
era of advanced globalization. Global cities have caught
the attention of geographers, sociologists, and scholars
of migration as important drivers of globalization proc-
esses and markers of a new global landscape (Friedmann
and Wolff 1982; Chase-Dunn 1984, 1985; Friedmann
1986; Castells 1989; Acuto 2011).7 As “spaces” in the
contemporary world economy, cities increasingly rival
states as sites of political, economic, and cultural power.
The concept of the global city, associated with the work
of Saskia Sassen (1991), was an attempt to rethink the
geography of contemporary globalization by examining
the consequences of the simultaneous dispersion and
concentration of global economic activities in urban
metropoles. As the world population becomes increas-
ingly urbanized, the combination of dispersion and con-
centration means that global cities can be viewed as
microcosms of broader global power relations, bringing
together—in close proximity—powerful global elites
and large underclasses in concentrated spaces.
Cities are also sites of institutional density and con-
centrated resources in the form of government offices,
cultural institutions, media outlets, transnational corpo-
rations, international organizations (IOs), and interna-
tional nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). They
are spaces in which the “local” and the “global” come
together—where decision-making, agenda-setting, cul-
tural production, and identity-formation processes occur
in ways that have ramifications beyond the confines of
the city, as they extend outward to a transnational polit-
ical sphere. Major global institutions, for example, are
not free-floating but are rather embedded in particular
geographic spaces. These are largely urban and metro-
politan, meaning that the institutional geography of
world politics is also a topography of urban spaces.
Many of the world’s mega-cities boast populations
that are greater than those of nation-states. They attract
flows of global capital and labor in the form of both in-
ternational finance and international migration. By at-
tracting both capital and labor, cities perform roles as
nodes in networks of global capital, and act as nodes in
international migration networks and global diaspora
politics. The urban geography of the city thus reflects
and replicates many of the broader structural inequal-
ities and power relations found in the international sys-
tem as a whole, but in a concentrated and condensed
space (Harvey 1973, 2000, 2012; Lefebvre 1991 [1974];
Sassen 1991; Massey 2007). Cities are characterized by
myriad “frictions” that are produced when diverse
global connections come together in particular locales
(Tsing 2004). The multiple types of networks that come
together and converge in close proximity can also lead
to an “implosion of a range of systemic contradictions
into the physical sites of global cities” (Curtis 2011,
1924).
Global cities are sites of “superdiversity,” containing
populations with ties around the world (Vertovec 2007).
In London, for example, 37% of the population is for-
eign born, which is similar to rates for New York, Los
Angeles, Amsterdam, Toronto, Sydney, and other major
global cities.8 The presence of globally linked popula-
tions, along with the symbolic role that cities play as
sites or nodes in networks of power in the world econ-
omy, make them important arenas of global identity pol-
itics that transcend homogenizing forms of national
identity. As sites of power in the global economy, they
are spaces that allow for access to global institutions, re-
sources, and media.
Major cities act as nodes that connect dispersed ac-
tivists in globally coordinated protests or campaigns.
For example, following military action against the
LTTE in Sri Lanka in 2009, coordinated protests by
Tamil groups abroad took place in London; Toronto;
Paris; New York; Washington, DC; Sydney; Melbourne;
Geneva; Berlin; Zurich; Oslo; Copenhagen; and The
Hague (Adamson and Kumar 2014). Mega cities are im-
portant spaces for global agenda setting and the forma-
tion of global public opinion due to the presence of
global media. All things being equal, events that take
place in London, Paris, New York, Cairo, or Istanbul
are more likely to receive media coverage and shape
global public discourse than events that occur in more
peripheral regions of the global economy.
7 Parts of this section draw on Adamson and Koinova (2013).
8 Information taken from 2011 UK Census, 2011 US Census,
and worldcitiescultureforum.com, accessed December 12,
2014.
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At the same time, and for similar reasons, cities are
also becoming important objects of security policy. Cities
are increasingly characterized by surveillance and by the
introduction of policing technologies designed to manage
urban protest. They have their own security strategies;
are engaged in networks of resilience to deal with terror-
ism or natural disasters; and work closely with their
counterparts around the globe in areas such as police ex-
changes and cooperation. Security policies that emerge in
one city (such as New York’s “zero-tolerance” policies
under Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in the 1990s) are diffused
and emulated by other cities. Formal and informal net-
works of cities such as the United Nations Office for
Disaster Risk Reduction Making Cities Resilient
Campaign9 or the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient
Cities initiative encourage exchanges between cities and
promote a sharing of practices.10
Cities and their workspaces, transport systems,
public spaces, and shopping malls have also become
focal points for larger global struggles. The rise in
asymmetric warfare and irregular combatants renders
traditional “national” security policies ineffective in
protecting urban infrastructures and populations
(Sassen 2010). One need only think of violent attacks
that have occurred in New York, Paris, London,
Madrid, Istanbul, Beirut, Nairobi, Bangkok, Jakarta,
and Mumbai. Such attacks receive global media cov-
erage and take on a symbolic dimension in public dis-
course, playing into larger global narratives and
discourses. Cities can be desirable targets due to the
density of their infrastructure and population, but
also due to the symbolic role they play as repositories
of global power, finance, and culture. The paradoxi-
cal and multifaceted dimensions of global cities—as
spaces of cosmopolitanism and capitalism, as well as
spaces marked by intense inequalities, increasing sur-
veillance, policing, and securitization—make them
key spaces for theorizing contemporary security.
Cities are at once embedded in particular national
spaces and contexts and subject to the jurisdiction of
national governments. But they also transcend these
national spaces. Cities are quasi-autonomous centers
of global power: they develop independent relations
with other cities, have their own urban identities, and
can implement autonomous security policies. In some
respects, cities are becoming actors in their own
right—competing with one another for resources and
status, forming alliances, and joining global
institutions—all behaviors that should not surprise ei-
ther realists or liberal internationalists.11
Cyberspace
Cyberspace is a new type of political space that has been
“created through technological innovation” and acts as
“a venue that allows users to engage in activities con-
ducted over electric fields whose spatial domains tran-
scend traditional territorial, governmental, social and
economic constraints” (Choucri 2012, 6). Similar to
global cities, cyberspace and social media function as
important platforms of agenda setting and political con-
testation in the emerging global public sphere.
Cyberspace, like global cities, can reflect global power
relations, but in a different structural (nonterritorial)
space in which connectivity and links are the currency of
power and influence. Cyberspace is an arena in and of it-
self in which forms of politics take place—on websites,
in chat rooms, and in other virtual spaces or platforms
(Adamson and Kumar 2014).
The effect of cyberspace on power distribution is not
predetermined but rather varies across cases. For exam-
ple, in comparing the effect of cyberspace on structures
of global finance and structures of global activism,
Sassen (2012, 459) notes that in the case of finance, cy-
berspace has simultaneously elevated the power of
“subnational scales such as the global city, and suprana-
tional scales, such as global markets, where previously
the national scale was dominant”—but in a way that in-
creasingly concentrates power and resources in the
hands of a few by circumventing state regulatory agen-
cies and exacerbating global inequalities. The opposite
is the case in the political realm, where weak and previ-
ously isolated locally embedded activists can “go glob-
al,” forming coalitions and alliances with other actors
online, thus engaging in transnational action without
physically moving. Social scientists have traditionally as-
sociated the “local” with physical or geographic prox-
imity, embedded in a nested hierarchy that includes the
“national” and the “global.” But new technologies dis-
rupt these hierarchies by enabling “multiscalar transac-
tions and simultaneous interconnectivity among those
largely confined to a locality.” Local actors can become
enmeshed in global networks without having to move,
as local settings become “microenvironments on global
circuits” (Sassen 2012, 466, 468).
Global power relations provide the context for and
inform the politics of cyberspace. For example, online
9 See http://www.unisdr.org/we/campaign/cities, accessed
October 3, 2015.
10 See http://www.100resilientcities.org/#/-_/, accessed
October 3, 2015. 11 I thank Timothy Crawford for making this observation.
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identity politics are largely conducted in English, with
key nodes and websites located in the global North
(Kumar 2012; Adamson and Kumar 2014). Politics con-
ducted online can bypass state authorities or censorship
laws by using international servers, in a kind of virtual
“boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). The role
of social media in the Arab Spring has been well studied,
but there are numerous other examples of “long-dis-
tance” political mobilization (Anderson 1998) that take
place via social media sites. The Islamist group Hizb ut-
Tahrir, for example, maintains a global media presence
via its office and website in London, although it is
banned in many other countries.
Tamil activists were able to avoid Sri Lankan censor-
ship by running websites from locations such as Toronto
and London (Whitaker 2004; Kumar 2012). The World
Wide Web thus becomes a nonterritorial space for the
enactment of identity politics accompanied by new
forms of symbolic politics and boundary maintenance
activities. Such activities transcend the territorial bound-
aries of states, although they are nevertheless affected by
and reflect the geopolitics of the interstate system. In
many cases, territoriality continues to play an important
symbolic role in online politics via the use of alternative
maps and cartographic images (Kurdistan, Khalistan,
Kashmir, Palestine, Tamil Eelam, the Islamic Caliphate)
to contest dominant geopolitical narratives and provide
a counter-hegemonic virtual alternative to existing terri-
torial-juridical realities. Online politics can, however,
also replicate “off-line” politics through the creation of
virtual spaces that mirror or extend, rather than chal-
lenge, existing community structures. Some Sikh actors,
for example, have created virtual spaces that replicate
existing physical spaces, such as the Gurdwara (temple)
or Langar Hall (community gathering place for meals at-
tached to temples) (Singh 2006; Adamson and Kumar
2014). Virtual space can also function as an arena in
which non-state actors recruit members or mobilize po-
litical support, disseminating images electronically that
are designed to galvanize virtual audiences (Bolt 2012).
This is not limited to nonviolent actors, as the example
of the online recruiting activities of IS makes all too
clear (Hoskins, Awan, and O’Loughlin 2011).12
Like cities, virtual space is also increasingly being
securitized—both through the extensive surveillance
and monitoring by state agencies (such as the US
National Security Agency) or multinational corpora-
tions but also as an arena itself of conflict between
various mixes of state and non-state actors, through
cyberwarfare, cyberattacks, and so-called “cyber ex-
ploitation” (Kello 2013). Even if the threat of
“cyberwar” has been exaggerated in some quarters, the
impact of cyberspace as a discrete and new type of
space that exists quasi-autonomously from the territo-
rial world of states has been underappreciated. Studies
of cyberwarfare, for example, have tended to focus on
the physical damage that cyberattacks could cause to
territorial state interests (Gartzke 2013), rather than
taking a long-term perspective on the underlying im-
pact that cyberspace has on the formation of new trans-
national identities (Betz 2014), and its potential to
delegitimize official state narratives and identities, thus
affecting the ability of state actors to reproduce the so-
cial cohesion that undergirds statist models of corpo-
rate agency.
The aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris,
for example, not only spilled into virtual space via the
online #JeSuisCharlie hashtag, but also spurred the on-
line “hacktivist” group Anonymous to threaten cyber-
warfare against so-called jihadi websites. Remarkably,
in the week following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, French
authorities reported that 19,000 websites had been
hacked in France—an unprecedented scale of coordi-
nated hacking incidents.13 Only a few days after the at-
tacks, a group claiming to be IS hacked into US Central
Command social media sites, doing little damage, but
receiving global news coverage, especially given that it
followed an incident in which the US-based branch of
the Sony corporation was allegedly hacked and threat-
ened by North Korea.14
Cyberspace is a distinct form of space that interacts
and coexists with the world of territorial states but it
does not function as the state system does and, therefore,
cannot be reduced to it. As Kello (2013, 7) notes, “it is
unclear how conventional security mechanisms, such as
deterrence and collective defense” apply in cyberspace.
Such rationalist models depend on the “bright bound-
aries” of a clearly delineated actor based on a collective
identity that can be engaged with strategically.
Cyberspace, via its networked structure, challenges the
traditional division between “insider” and “outsider”
that have accompanied the rise of the nation-state. The
12 See also Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS and the Lonely Young
American,” New York Times, June 27, 2015.
13 Andrew Griffin, “Charlie Hebdo: France Hit by 19,000
Cyberattacks Since Paris Shootings in Unprecedented
Hacking Onslaught,” The Independent, January 15, 2015.
14 Dan Lamothe, “U.S. Military Social Media Accounts
Apparently Hacked by Islamic State Sympathizers,”
Washington Post, January 13, 2015.
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technologies of nationalism, which produced “imagined
communities” via print capitalism, relied on the simulta-
neity of the shared experience of participating in a
largely unseen yet still territorially delineated commu-
nity via engagement with a national language press
(Anderson 1983). In the context of advanced globaliza-
tion, imagined communities can stretch far beyond the
state and into wholly new spaces (Deibert 1997). This
both increases global connectivity and leads to the emer-
gence of global publics and a global public sphere, but
may simultaneously lead to new forms of fractionaliza-
tion, rivalry, and identity-based political contestation
that do not correspond to specific territorial locations.
Increased connectivity empowers weaker non-state ac-
tors, allowing for tactical innovations that challenge the
nature of conventional warfare and in which conflicts
become “less contests of arms than wars of hearts and
minds conducted on a mass scale through multimedia
communications networks” (Betz 2014).
The Global Polity
Finally, I discuss the possibility of the “global polity” as
a discrete space that needs to be better conceptualized in
relation to security. The “international level” of world
politics has always played an important role in tradi-
tional security studies, often via the notion of anarchy
(Waltz 1954, 1979; Wolfers 1961; Milner 1991;
Donnelly 2015). But it has functioned as a socially thin
space that is notable largely for its lack of clear institu-
tional or political structures. The lack of theorization of
the international exemplifies par excellence the extent to
which traditional security studies has treated space as an
unproblematic background to state-centric world poli-
tics, such as balance-of-power and power politics strug-
gles among nation-states.
However, there are many other imaginings and con-
structions of “the global” in the study of world politics
beyond that of international anarchy (Booth 2008;
Walker 2010). Liberals have long had a more complex
view of the international as a space in which anarchy
and conflict could be transcended via shared norms and
international institutions, as well as commerce and trade
(Angell 2006). Kantian perspectives on the international
hold out the possibility of a republican zone of peace—a
vision that has been taken up by a variety of constructiv-
ist and republican theorists (Doyle 1986; Wendt 1999;
Deudney 2007). Globalists speak of a “flat” and
“borderless world” in which global capital and finance
can, thanks to technology, move across the world in an
instant (Ohmae 1999; Friedman 2005), whereas
Marxist-influenced theorists have examined the world
as consisting not of states-in-anarchy, but rather of a
core and periphery, connected via hierarchical relations
of global elites (Wallerstein 2004). These approaches
differ radically from neorealist approaches in their focus
on the role of “uneven and combined development” in
structuring the international, as opposed to the struc-
tural feature of “anarchy” (Rosenberg 2013a, 2013b).
Social constructivists and scholars influenced by
public international law and the Groatian tradition have
also developed richer notions of the world as a space
defined by constitutional structures and shared
identities—or what English School scholars refer to as
an International Society. In this perspective, warfare and
diplomacy are not merely behaviors that take place
within the space of the international, but are social prac-
tices and institutions that constitute it as a social space
(Bull 1977; Reus-Smit 1999; Wendt 1999). Normative
approaches to the global provide even more benevolent
visions of the world as a single political space defined by
an emerging cosmopolitan democracy (Held 1995;
Archibugi 2008) or, more holistically, as a living organ-
ism, Gaia or Anima Mundi (Lovelock 1995; Fideler
2014).
Sociological institutionalists, of course, have taken
seriously the idea of a “world polity” that is “consti-
tuted by a distinct culture—a set of fundamental princi-
ples and models, mainly ontological and cognitive in
character, defining the nature and purposes of social ac-
tors and action” (Boli and Thomas 1997). As distinct
from actor-based approaches to IR, the state is treated
not primarily as a “unit” but rather as a particular insti-
tutional form that has diffused across the planet and
which is intertwined with other forms of rational bu-
reaucracies, such as IOs and INGOs. Together, these or-
ganizations create a densely structured space that can be
thought of as a world polity (Meyer et al. 1997).
In a sense, then, the world as a whole can be
thought of as a political space—it is an aggregate of
different and overlapping spaces, but also a coherent
polity in and of itself. However, as security scholars,
we still do not have a good sense of how to conceptual-
ize and theorize the global polity as an integrated
space. There are promising approaches for combining a
global polity approach with other theoretical tools,
such as social movement theory, social network theory,
and relational or practice-based approaches (Jackson
and Nexon 1999; Adamson 2005; Montgomery 2005;
Goddard 2009; Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and
Montgomey 2009; Kahler 2009; Nexon 2009;
MacDonald 2014). Network-based approaches com-
bine well with spatial analyses—network dependencies
can be either constrained or enabled by particular types
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of spatial relationships.15 Social movement theory and
transnational contentious politics approaches employ
the concept of political opportunity structures (Tarrow
1994, 2005), which also provides a means of mapping
out power relations at the global level in a way that
transcends state-centrism. Although the capitals of
powerful states are important sites of power, they exist
side-by-side with other power configurations, including
IOs, powerful NGOs, and corporations, as well as
spaces and nodes, such as global cities. Understanding
how sites of power (many of which are physically lo-
cated in the global North) intersect with global periph-
eries (in the global South, but also in marginalized
enclaves in the global North) is a key question for con-
temporary security studies and should be of particular
interest to those interested in the dynamics of transna-
tional contention.
The study of diaspora politics (e.g., Shain and Barth
2003; Wayland 2004; Fair 2005; Lyons 2006;
Brinkerhoff 2009; Koinova 2011, 2014; Adamson
2013) can be helpful in shedding light on some of these
broader power imbalances that structure the global pol-
ity as a single space. Ong (2003), for example, has noted
the problems and complications that arise when a global
northern-based elite seeks to speak “on behalf” of “its”
diaspora, as in the case of Chinese political entrepre-
neurs in the West mobilizing on behalf of ethnic Chinese
in Indonesia following intercommunal violence in 1998.
In that case, the global political activities of the largely
US-based diaspora activists may have actually exacer-
bated ethnic tensions by tagging the local Chinese com-
munity’s identity as ethnically different from the
majority population rather than as Indonesian.
Similarly, online Palestinian identity politics is con-
ducted predominantly in English or other European lan-
guages and directed toward Northern and Western
audiences, with little or no presence of Palestinian mi-
grant labor populations in Gulf States (Adamson and
Kumar 2014).
Dispersed global diaspora populations are linked to
each other (often via cyberspace) across very differently
situated spaces in different parts of the globe, thus call-
ing into question the relationships between identity and
locale, or the socio-spatial and the geospatial. Scholars,
for example, have distinguished between “near” and
“far” diasporas that are connected via particular con-
flicts or instances of political mobilization. In the
Liberian civil war of the last decade, the “far diaspora”
located in the United States and the United Kingdom
was more enabled to engage in symbolic politics and
was less a victim of physical violence than the regional
Liberian refugee diasporas in neighboring Ivory Coast,
Ghana, and Sierra Leone.16 Similarly, the experience of
members of the Afghan diaspora in North America and
Europe has been different from those in refugee camps
in neighboring Pakistan (Harpviken 2008; Sperling
2013).
Tracing connections between post-national or non-
national spaces, such as global cities, cyberspace, and
global peripheries, also shows how different “spaces” in
the global economy—both highly institutionalized and
resource-rich, but also weakly institutionalized and re-
source-poor—become linked with each other strategi-
cally, as actors take advantage of the unique resources
and opportunities that exist across various types of
spaces. In armed conflicts, for example, lobbying,
agenda setting, and public diplomacy may be used by
non-state actors in global cities and in cyberspace,
whereas global peripheries are used as “safe havens” for
the training of insurgents and fighters. This is a pattern
that was seen in the Kurdish and Kosovar conflicts in
the 1990s, with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) engaging in politi-
cal lobbying and agenda setting in the capitals of Europe
and North America, while running military training
camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley (for the PKK) and in
Albania (for the KLA) (Watts 2004; Adamson 2005).
Similar core-periphery dynamics exist with contempo-
rary militant Islamist groups, who use weakly institu-
tionalized peripheries and zones of conflict for safe
havens or training camps, while engaging in recruitment
and political mobilization activities in Europe and else-
where. In this sense, the links that emerged between the
Paris attack suspects in the Charlie Hebdo case and al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, located in Yemen, as
well as IS-controlled regions of northern Syria, are sim-
ply examples of larger dynamics that link spaces in the
highly institutionalized core with conflict zones in
weakly institutionalized peripheries (Adamson 2005).
Much like Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) “boomerang
pattern,” in which NGOs exit one state to take advan-
tage of transnational resources, opportunities and alli-
ances in the global North, so, too, can armed insurgent
organizations use this strategy to increase their influence
and power (Adamson 2005; Bob 2005). The rise of for-
eign fighters in Syria and Iraq (Hegghammer 2013;
Malet 2013; Bakke 2014), the concern about links
15 Thanks to Alexander Montgomery for raising this point.
16 I am indebted to Robtel Pailey for discussions on the
Liberian diaspora.
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between organizations and actors in Europe and conflict
zones in the Middle East, and concerns about IS- and al-
Qaeda-inspired terrorism around the world all suggest a
security environment in which the “bright boundaries”
of conflict do not fall neatly at state borders, but rather
transcend and penetrate into states.
Of course, the “global” as a space is also increasingly
becoming securitized in discourse and practice. The as-
sertion of global dominance by powerful states via sur-
veillance technology, drone warfare, new military
technologies, and covert activities exists side-by-side
with the global activities of non-state actors. Powerful
states and military organizations struggle to create an
appropriate language for describing the topography of a
globalized security environment that is characterized by
counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, and a lack of
clear geographic boundaries with which to define “the
enemy.” This results in the use of terms such as “sanctu-
aries,” “safe havens,” “operating environments,” “en-
abling environments,” and “terrain complexity”—terms
that can be employed across contexts but may also ob-
scure the complexities involved in delineating relevant
geographical spaces of conflict (Innes 2008). With the
9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004) declaring
that “the American Homeland is the Planet,” with the
US military aiming for “Full Spectrum Dominance,”
with satellite technologies available to anyone via
Google Earth, with a saturated 24/7 global media envi-
ronment, and other technological developments, it is
truly possible now to speak in terms of “global secu-
rity.” In this new global reality, it is important to find
ways of tracing global power relations beyond the
“counting poles” approach of state-centric security stud-
ies and to find more nuanced ways to analyze how dif-
ferent spaces are linked to each other—urban contexts
with conflict zones, virtual online spaces with off line
political engagement, and transnational identity politics
in the global North with armed conflict in the global
South. This is a much more complex and variegated spa-
tial reality than is portrayed in most models of security
studies.
Conclusions
Why does the field of security studies seem, on the face
of it, to provide so little analytical leverage for under-
standing the “globalization” of contemporary political
violence? Standard categories, such as “interstate” and
“intrastate,” do not adequately capture the complex se-
curity linkages that exist across seemingly dispersed lo-
cations in a world in which we see the blurring of
“external” and “internal” security concerns, accompa-
nied by an ongoing securitization of new spaces and pla-
ces of public and social life. State-centric approaches to
security have, to a greater or lesser extent, operated with
assumptions of “methodological nationalism” that treat
the state as a natural social and political form. Relaxing
assumptions of methodological nationalism in security
studies allows us to better conceptualize security—or the
deployment and management of violence—as a socio-
spatial practice. It suggests new “spaces” of security that
are ripe for further study.
What does this analysis imply for the future of
global security? First, the analysis suggests the utility
of extending the scope and lens of our object of study
to include a wider range of spaces of security. This in-
cludes global cities, cyberspace, and the “global pol-
ity” but could (and should) also extend to other sites
and spaces, such as refugee camps, humanitarian
spaces, the high seas, and sites of detention and
incarceration—to name but a few. The examples pre-
sented above of global cities and cyberspace illustrate
how focusing on post- or non-national spaces can pro-
vide us additional analytical leverage on the contempo-
rary security environment, but they are by no means
exhaustive.
A “spatial turn” suggests the need to move beyond
methodological nationalism to a richer and more varie-
gated theorization of space. Such a theorization could be
fruitfully married to already-existing approaches in hu-
man security, environmental security, and feminist
approaches (e.g., Spike Peterson 1992; True 1995; Paris
2001; Sjoberg 2013; Enloe 2014), and also to
approaches that focus on collective mobilization, net-
works, practices, and relationalism (Jackson and Nexon
1999; Neumann 2002; Sageman 2004; Slaughter 2004;
Montgomery 2005; Pouliot 2008; Goddard 2009;
Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomey 2009; Nexon
2009; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Bigo 2011; Shapiro
2013; Bueger and Gadinger 2015; MacDonald 2014).
Realist and state-centric approaches, however, would
also benefit from paying greater attention to the chang-
ing spatial practices of states (such as drone warfare,
cybersurveillance, and diaspora engagement policies), as
well as how spatial transformations in the exercise of
state power affect states’ relationships with each other,
and with other actors in the global security
environment.
Second, adopting a socio-spatial perspective on se-
curity is an initial step toward better understanding the
relationship between identity politics, spatial practices,
and shifts in the distribution of power across the global
system, including how those impact on practices of
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security under conditions of advanced globalization.
Whereas the nation-state as a spatial configuration
brings together identity, territory, and the management
of lethal violence in such a way that it can be conceptu-
alized as a unit, and that unit interacts with other simi-
larly constituted “units,” this is only one possible
spatial configuration of identity, territory, and vio-
lence. The notion of “ontological security” has been
fruitful for understanding how a state reproduces its
corporate identity in relation to other states (Giddens
1991; Mitzen 2006) and may become even more perti-
nent under conditions in which the corporate identity
of states is increasingly challenged by market forces,
transnational identities, global religious movements,
and other nonterritorial identities.
Increased connectivity and a saturated global media
environment have the potential to produce more general
anxieties about space, control, the state, and territory.
One of the features of a new globalized security environ-
ment is the lack of clear-cut territorially defined identity
boundaries between “self” and “other” or “friend” and
“enemy” in non-national spaces (Gros 2010). How ac-
tors respond to the “identity-blurring” effects of ad-
vanced globalization, the emergence of global identity
politics, and “superdiversity” may be one of the key is-
sues of the twenty-first century. The future of global se-
curity will therefore be closely linked to the politics of
identity—that is, how skilled political leaders are at pro-
actively engaging with global identity politics, fostering
integration, and promoting dialogue across diverse
identities—as opposed to reactively trying to reenforce
bright boundaries via violence, demagoguery, polarizing
language, or other means. The challenge is to nurture
forms of social and cultural capital and to construct new
narratives that foster a sense of collective identity and
belonging under conditions of advanced globalization.
Third, the analysis suggests the need to pay much
greater attention to alternative practices of security, in-
cluding transformations in state security practices and
discourses beyond conventional warfare. This includes
the “micro-politics” and “micro-practices” of security
that are connected to policing, surveillance, intelligence,
and other sifting and disciplining mechanisms that oper-
ate across different types of spaces. Such practices in-
creasingly securitize new spaces and places of public life
and similarly correspond to the decoupling of identity,
territory, and security. In liberal and non-national
spaces, there is no explicit political “other” to be visualized
or identified beyond vague references to non-identity and
non-territorial categories of illiberalism (such as “violent
extremism”). With a lack of ideological or identity basis
for determining “friend–enemy” security distinctions,
highly technical sifting and surveillance processes come in-
creasingly to the fore. Policing and surveillance (and resis-
tance to policing) are certainly not new, but are gaining a
new prominence in response to transformations in the
broader socio-spatial context, and they are still undertheor-
ized in the field of security studies (but see Andreas 2003;
della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006; Rosenberg 2006;
Bigo 2011; Berenskoetter 2012).
Finally, the analysis calls into question theoretical
distinctions between “materialist” or “rationalist”
approaches to security versus “constructivist” or iden-
tity-based approaches. Such distinctions only make sense
in cases in which “units” are already clearly defined as
“actors.” Rationalist models of strategic bargaining and
deterrence rely on already-constituted actors, with iden-
tities and interests that are naturalized to such an extent
that the mix of symbolic and material micro-practices
that undergirds and constitutes collective identity forma-
tion and corporate agency is rendered invisible. Rather
than starting with pre-existing actors, security scholars
also need to understand the underlying conditions under
which security practices and the deployment of violence
coincide with territorially defined collective identities,
versus when violence can be used to transform
“blurred” and porous boundaries into “bright” ones in
alternative socio-spatial configurations. In doing so, the
relationship between security, violence, and identity can
be made clearer, and security can be better understood
as one form of a boundary-making practice that takes
on different logics in different spatial configurations.
A focus on post-national and non-national spaces of
global security provides a means for security studies to
move beyond the trappings of methodological national-
ism. This article has suggested the utility of this ap-
proach by focusing on three such spaces. As I suggest
above, there are many others. In addition, a focus on the
spatiality of security discourses and practices can be
helpful for understanding transformations in state
security practices, including spatial transformations in
the exercise of state power.
A theoretical focus on the relationship between spatial
practices and the politics of security need not mean that we
throw out the state as an important site of analysis, nor
does it require us to fall into the trap of naı¨ve globalism or
spatial determinism (Porter 2015). Indeed, realist
approaches to security can benefit from a “spatial turn” as
much as other approaches to security—be they networked,
human, feminist, liberal, or cosmopolitan approaches.
Conditions of advanced globalization are reconfiguring
both state and non-state spaces, allowing for the flourish-
ing of new identities, the redistribution of power to new
sites and actors, and the emergence of new post-national or
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non-national spaces of security such as cities and cyber-
space. Security studies in the twenty-first century could bet-
ter reflect these trends by moving beyond a methodological
nationalist lens and by embracing a “spatial turn.”
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